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ABSTRACT
Hanschmann, Jason (M.A., Philosophy)
Statues, Lumps, and Identity
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Robert Rupert
In his 1975 article “Contingent Identity,” Allan Gibbard purportedly shows that not all 
identity statements containing proper names are necessarily true.  The thrust of his argument 
comes from a clever statue-and-lump case.  Specifically, Gibbard claims that two proper names 
that refer to identical objects could have referred to distinct objects.  In my thesis I argue that the 
postulation of contingent identity immediately presents one with a contradiction—specifically, 
one where identity statements containing proper names are both necessarily true (i.e. true in all 
possible worlds) and yet also fail to be true in some possible world W.  Furthermore, I argue that 
the proponent of contingent identity conflates an object with the properties used to fix the 
reference of a designator of the object.  Ultimately, I show that upholding a Kripkean notion of 
naming and reference allows one to uphold the necessity of identity in light of Gibbard’s statue-
and-lump case.
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1Overview
Since Kant there has been a big split between philosophers who thought that all necessary truths 
were analytic and philosophers who thought that some necessary truths were synthetic a priori.  
But none of these philosophers thought that a (metaphysically) necessary truth could fail to be a 
priori: the Kantian tradition was as guilty as the empiricist tradition of equating metaphysical and 
epistemic necessity.1
The announcement of identity between rigid designators as “…necessarily true (if true at 
all) and a posteriori… was a remarkable advance in semantics.”2  According to Saul Kripke 
(1971, 1980), any proper name is a rigid designator that refers to the same object in all possible 
worlds.  Thus, any true identity statement (whether a priori or a posteriori) formed with proper 
names is necessarily true if true at all.  
However, in the 1975 article “Contingent Identity,” Allan Gibbard purportedly shows 
that not all identity statements containing proper names are necessarily true.3  The thrust of his 
argument comes from a clever statue-and-lump case.  Specifically, Gibbard claims that two 
proper names that refer to identical objects could have referred to distinct objects.
The issue I address in this paper is whether one can reasonably reject the necessity of 
identity claims that involve proper names as rigid designators in response to problematic statue-
and-lump cases.  The specific statue-and-lump case I examine is Gibbard’s.  The thrust of it is 
that completely coincident objects, which appear to be identical, could have been otherwise.  
Such cases, according to Gibbard, are examples of contingent identity.  In the first section I 
provide a brief explanation of Gibbard’s case.  I then argue that the doctrine of contingent 
identity yields absurd conclusions.  However, cases such as Gibbard’s provide problems for the 
                                                
1 Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 233.
2 Stephen P. Schwartz, “Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity: A Reply to LaPorte,” Philosophical Studies 109 
(2002): 270.
3 Allan Gibbard, “Contingent Identity,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1975): 187.
2necessity of identity which cannot easily be avoided.  In the second section I focus on some 
common solutions to statue-and-lump cases.  These solutions, which are compatible with the 
necessity of identity, look to the constitution of the statue and lump in order to find their answer.  
In the end, I show that this is a misguided approach to solving such problems.  The final section 
of this paper approaches Gibbard’s statue-and-lump case as an issue of language rather than 
material constitution.  Specifically, I argue that the proponent of contingent identity conflates an 
object with the properties that are used to fix the reference of a designator of the object.  In this 
section I show that upholding a Kripkean notion of naming and reference allows one to uphold 
the necessity of identity in light of Gibbard’s statue-and-lump case.
3I. The Necessity of Identity
In this first section I present the case of Goliath and Lumpl, a quintessential example of 
statue-and-lump cases.  After briefly describing the case, I argue that the conclusion Gibbard 
draws from it—that there are contingent identities—is unpalatable.  Specifically, I argue that 
contingent identity results in the absurd conclusion that two objects x and y can be both 
necessarily identical (i.e. identical in all possible worlds) and yet also fail to be identical in some 
possible world W.
I.A Goliath and Lumpl4
Suppose that a piece of clay P consists of a portion of clay.  This piece P exists when all 
parts of P stick together and no part of P sticks to any portion of clay that is not part of P.5  Thus
it follows that a new piece of clay can be formed by either breaking off part of P or attaching 
more clay to P.  However, remolding P into different shapes does not threaten the existence of P.
Now suppose that a statue comes into existence from the joining of two appropriately 
molded pieces of clay.  One piece of clay is molded into the shape of the top half of a statue.  A 
second piece is molded into the shape of the bottom half of a statue.  When these two pieces stick 
together they form not only one statue, but a new piece of clay as well. Let us call the piece of 
clay ‘Lumpl’ and the statue ‘Goliath.’  Thus, we could say that Lumpl and Goliath came into 
                                                
4 The following example is adapted from Allan Gibbard’s 1975 article “Contingent Identity.”
Gibbard, “Contingent Identity,” 190-192.
5 A piece or lump of clay is unlike a portion of clay.  According to Gibbard, a piece has persistence criteria such that 
it ceases to exist when broken up or added to.  A portion, however, can be dispersed and continue to exist.  Gibbard, 
“Contingent Identity,” 188.
4existence at the same time.  However, suppose the sculptor who created Goliath has a 
mischievous child, and this child accidentally knocks the statue to the ground while playing 
baseball in the house.  When the statue hits the ground, it breaks.  And when it breaks, both 
Goliath and Lumpl cease to exist.  Thus Lumpl and Goliath cease to exist at the same time.
Initially, it seems like Goliath and Lumpl are identical.  Both the statue and piece of clay 
come into existence and cease to exist at the same time.  Furthermore, throughout their entire 
existences, Lumpl constitutes Goliath.  However, it seems possible that, before the sculptor’s
child has a chance to destroy the statue, the sculptor becomes dissatisfied with his own work.  
Suppose he is dissatisfied with Goliath only minutes after its creation—before the clay hardens.  
The sculptor then molds Lumpl into another, more aesthetically satisfying shape.  If this was the 
case, we would then say that Lumpl outlives Goliath.  Thus they would not be identical.
So, even if the statue and piece of clay come into existence at the same time t1 and cease
to exist at the same time t2, the piece of clay could have survived the statue.  Thus if they are 
identical in the former scenario, they purportedly are not necessarily identical due to the 
possibility of the latter scenario.  In fact, according to contingent identity theorists like Gibbard, 
if they are identical at all, they are so only contingently.
I.B Contingent Identity
Consider a contradiction—one in which Goliath has some property S and not-S— that 
follows from the contingent identity of Goliath and Lumpl:6
                                                
6 This argument is adapted from David Lewis’s 1971 article “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies.”
David Lewis, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 204.
5(1) In the first case, where both Lumpl and Goliath come to be and cease to be at the 
same times, Lumpl = Goliath.
(2) However, Goliath could not have survived being remolded into a different shape.  
Lumpl could have.
But if we use the identity statement in (1) in order to substitute ‘Goliath’ for ‘Lumpl’ in (2), we 
get:
(3) However, Goliath could not have survived being remolded into a different shape.  
Goliath could have.
Clearly, something has gone wrong in (3).  But how might one avoid this absurd conclusion?  
One might claim that the above contradiction is not actually a problem because Goliath 
and Lumpl are only contingently identical.  Suppose we have two worlds W and W*.  Suppose 
that x = y in W guaranteeing that all properties of x in W are shared by y in W.  However, this is 
not the case in W*—x ≠ y in W*.  A proponent of contingent identity would claim that x and y 
are identical in W because in that specific world W, x and y share all properties.  The fact that 
they do not share all the same properties in all possible worlds is irrelevant to their world-
specific identity relation.  This would be a case of contingent identity, as x and y are only 
identical in some worlds.  
To avoid the contradiction generated above, the proponent of contingent identity might
argue that the identity substitution made in statement (3) is invalid.  Consider Leibniz’s principle 
of the indiscernibility of identicals: (x) (y) (x = y [Fx  Fy]).  In other words, those things 
which are identical have all properties in common.7  One might argue that Goliath and Lumpl in 
(1) are completely coincident.  That is, throughout their entire careers, Lumpl constitutes 
                                                
7 Gibbard claims that if x and y do not begin to exist and cease to exist at the same time, they are not identical.  Their 
identity is to be understood as all properties being in common in a strict, timeless sense, “…not as mere identity 
during some period of time.”  Gibbard, “Contingent Identity,” 188.
6Goliath.  They begin their existence at the same time and cease to exist at the same time.  They 
share all their properties.  And never at any point during their careers does one exist without the 
other.  In this sense, they are identical.  But this is not the same case as described in statement 
(2).  The intuition encapsulated by statement (2) is motivated by the possibility of some other 
world (not the actual world) in which Lumpl and Goliath are only partially coincident—Lumpl 
outlives Goliath.  Thus they do not share all properties and are not identical.  Therefore one 
might suggest that the identity between Lumpl and Goliath is contingent such that the relation is 
merely world-bound.  Their identity does not carry over to other possible worlds.  Thus she 
might claim that if Lumpl and Goliath are not identical in W*, it would be clearly wrong to 
substitute ‘Goliath’ for ‘Lumpl,’ regardless of their identity in some other possible world.  
Similarly, if they are identical in W then their identity applies only to world W.  To substitute 
‘Goliath’ for ‘Lumpl’ in W* based on their identity in W would be wrong.  Thus the identity 
relation in (1) does not apply to statement (2).  For (1) refers to a world where Lumpl and 
Goliath are identical and (2) does not.  And if this is true, we cannot properly substitute ‘Goliath’ 
for ‘Lumpl’ as is performed in (3).
However, this appeal to contingent identity seems strange.  For if two objects are 
identical, how can they be only contingently identical? I think it is intuitively clear that an object 
that exists is necessarily identical to itself: (x) □ (x = x).  Now suppose we have objects A and B.  
We can conclude ‘□ (A = A)’ and ‘□ (B = B)’.  And if they are numerically identical then ‘A = B’.  
From this identity relation between A and B, we should be able to substitute ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
interchangeably.  Thus we should be able to conclude ‘□ (A = B)’ or ‘□ (B = A)’.  Therefore it 
seems that it should follow that those which are identical are necessarily identical: (x) (y) (x = y
 □ x = y). But can the proponent of contingent identity simply deny the substitution of 
7identicals here in a similar way she denies the substitution made in statements (1) through (3)?  
No, I think not.  Again, suppose we have two worlds, W and W*.  Now suppose in W terms A and 
B refer to the same thing.  Thus, in world W, we should be able to substitute the object referred to 
by A for the object referred to by B and vice versa without any problems.  However, it also seems 
clearly true that ‘□ (A = A)’ and ‘□ (B = B)’.  Thus, in world W, if the object referred to by A is 
identical to the object referred to by B such that they are completely interchangeable, we should 
be able to get ‘□ (A = B)’ or ‘□ (B = A)’ without any difficulty.  But if A and B do not refer to the 
same thing in world W*, we arrive at an absurdity.  From ‘A = B’ we can derive ‘□ (A = B).’  
And since ‘A = B’ is true in W, ‘□ (A = B)’ is also true in W.  But that means ‘A = B’ is true in all 
worlds.  Thus ‘A ≠ B’ is not true in W*.  Therefore, an absurdity results from simply claiming 
that the object referred to by A and the object referred to by B are identical in some scenarios but
not in others.
Similarly, Kripke claims that those who accept the necessity of self-identity—‘(x) □ (x = 
x)’—are committed to the necessity of identity.8  Supposing that we can talk meaningfully about 
modal properties, we can talk about modality de re: that is, the necessary possession by objects 
of certain properties.  And, given Leibniz’s indiscernibility of identicals, if objects x and y are 
identical then all properties, including all modal properties, must be shared.  This, according to 
Kripke, applies even to those properties which attribute other properties necessarily—in 
particular, the property of necessarily being identical to an object.  If an object x has the property 
F such that F is the property of necessarily being identical to x, y’s identity to x entails that y is 
also F.  Thus, if ‘□ (x = x)’ and ‘x = y’ then both x and y must share all the same properties, 
including that of being necessarily identical to x.
                                                
8 Saul Kripke, “Identity and Necessity,” in Identity and Individuation, ed. Milton K. Munitz (New York: New York 
University Press, 1971), 164.
8Still, this may not convince the supporter of contingent identity.  The substitutivity 
principle resulting in ‘□ (x = y)’ may still seem false.9  Leibniz’s principle of the indiscernibility 
of identicals is about properties and relations.  According to the principle, if x and y are identical, 
then they share all the same properties.  Similarly, for anything z, if x stands in relation to z then 
y stands in the same relation to z.  This principle allows for substitutivity, one might argue, 
“…only for contexts that attribute properties and relations.”10  Therefore one might deny the 
substitution of identicals in ‘□ (x = _)’ because this does not attribute a property.  According to 
this argument, as Gibbard describes it, modal expressions such as necessarily being identical to x
are not properties that a thing can have or lack.  This is because “modal expressions do not apply 
to concrete things independently of the way they are designated.”11  For example, a particular 
lump of clay may display certain properties (being Goliath-shaped, constituting a particular 
statue, etc.) but not others—specifically, they may not display their modal properties (possibly 
being vase-shaped, possibly being a ball, etc.).  The problem here, according to Gibbard, is that 
these modal properties change depending on the way an object is designated.  Suppose ‘Lumpl’
is designated as a particular lump of clay.  When designated as such, Lumpl is essentially a lump 
of clay.  However, suppose that it is not essential to Goliath that it be molded out of clay.  If we 
instead use the term ‘Lumpl’ to designate the material that constitutes Goliath, Lumpl is no 
longer essentially a lump of clay.  Instead, Lumpl now has the property of necessarily being 
Goliath-shaped.  Thus concrete objects alone do not have or lack certain modal properties.  It is 
the pair of the object and the way it is designated that has or lacks modal properties.  Therefore, 
                                                
9 Gibbard, “Contingent Identity,” 201.  The following objection to the substitutivity of identicals is mainly taken 
from Gibbard.  He refers to this objection as “the usual answer” to the absurdity generated by substitutivity.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
9asking about a concrete object’s modal properties independently of the way it is designated is 
meaningless.
Now, it seems that Gibbard and the essentialist are simply talking past each other.  
Consider the fact that they may agree about all the facts involved in the following sentence: “The 
material that constitutes Goliath could not have failed to be a lump of clay.”  They both may 
acknowledge that Goliath is a statue molded from a lump of clay—Lumpl.  They both may even 
acknowledge the fact that Lumpl could be a different shape.  However, they disagree about the 
truth value of the proposition in question.  This disagreement occurs because the proponent of 
contingent identity assumes a de dicto interpretation of modal expressions while the essentialist 
assumes a de re one.  Consider the object referred to by ‘the material that constitutes Goliath.’  
Now, the question “Could the thing referred to by ‘the material that constitutes Goliath’ have 
failed to be a lump of clay?” seems like a perfectly coherent one.  In fact, I believe the clear 
answer to this question is that it could not have failed to be in such a relation.  Thus, the object 
referred to by ‘the material that constitutes Goliath’—Lumpl—has the property of necessarily 
being a lump of clay.  In fact, if ‘the material that constitutes Goliath’ just is Lumpl, how could it 
have been something else?  However, this is clearly not the same as saying that the material that 
constitutes Goliath is a lump of clay necessarily.  The material could have easily been wood or 
marble.  This, I believe, is how the anti-essentialist interprets modal expressions when applied to 
concrete things.  If one adopts a de dicto interpretation of modal expressions, the properties
attributed to an object depend on the way that object is designated.  
I find Gibbard’s argument—that we should not endorse the substitution of identicals in 
modal expressions—unconvincing.  This is because it relies on an unfounded assumption of the
de dicto reading of modal expressions.  Now, what reason would one have for adopting a de 
10
dicto interpretation of modal expressions?  As far as I can tell, we have none.  Gibbard and the 
anti-essentialists provide us with no reason why the de dicto interpretation should override the de 
re one.  In fact, it seems we have good reason to believe that the de re interpretation trumps the 
de dicto one.  When we make claims like “Hesperus is Phosphorous,” we seem to be using the de 
re interpretation.  By making such claims, we are acknowledging that Hesperus and Phosphorous 
are one and the same thing.  So when someone tells us “Hesperus is the evening star,” we can 
further conclude that the object known as the evening star also pinpoints Phosphorous because 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ refer to the same object.  This is because singular terms in non-
modal claims range over particular individuals.  For example, in ‘Hesperus = Phosphorous’ the 
terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ pick out the same planet-individual.
I.C Concluding Remarks
In the last few paragraphs I have argued (i) that modal expressions attribute properties 
under a de re interpretation and (ii) that one has good reason to believe a de re reading of modal 
expressions trumps a de dicto reading. If both (i) and (ii) are true, then it seems that modal 
contexts do in fact attribute properties.  And because of this, Gibbard and the proponent of 
contingent identity cannot block the substitutivity of identicals when applied to modal 
expressions.  Thus, if we postulate contingent identity we are immediately involved in an 
absurdity—specifically, one where two objects can be both necessarily identical and possibly not 
identical.  Therefore the doctrine of contingent identity is incoherent.  
In the next section, I examine some possible solutions to lump-and-statue cases which are 
compatible with the necessity of identity.  In particular, I examine two commonly proposed 
11
solutions—(a) Statues and lumps are two distinct objects; (b) neither object exists, only their 
mereological simples do.  Both strategies, in a misguided effort, propose solutions that examine 
the constitution of statues and lumps in order to address problematic statue-and-lump cases.
12
II. Solutions Compatible with the Necessity of Identity
Even if contingent identity is implausible, the case of Goliath and Lumpl (and similar 
statue-and-lump cases) may force the proponent of the necessity of identity to embrace strange 
and counterintuitive views about concrete objects.  There are many possible solutions to the 
problematic statue-and-lump puzzle.  Some philosophers claim that material constitution is not 
identity because the statue and lump differ in their properties.  Thus the statue and lump are 
distinct, non-identical objects.  Others, however, reject the existence of ordinary things such as 
statues and lumps of clay, arguing that only the fundamental level of reality exists.  In this 
section, I survey some proposed solutions to the puzzle of Lumpl and Goliath and discuss their 
plausibility.  Even though the strategies I present are compatible with the necessity of identity, I 
argue that each solution runs into problems of its own and is not satisfying.
II.A Two Distinct Objects
According to the necessity of identity, if Goliath and Lumpl are identical, it is necessarily 
true that they are identical.  However, due to the possibility that Lumpl outlives Goliath, it seems 
like the proponent of the necessity of identity would have to claim that Lumpl and Goliath are 
not identical.  But considering the first scenario where Lumpl and Goliath are completely 
coincident, how would one go about arguing that they are actually distinct objects?  To argue 
this, one might claim that material constitution is not sufficient for identity.  Let us call this the 
constitution view.
13
Consider the fact that Goliath is made from Lumpl.  More specifically, Goliath is made 
from a particular lump of clay which happens to be named ‘Lumpl’.  However, this does not
mean that Goliath is identical to Lumpl.  To see why constitution is not identity, let us start by 
contrasting the constitution relation with the identity relation.  First, while identity is 
symmetrical, constitution is asymmetrical.  For example: It would be correct to say “Goliath is 
made from Lumpl,” but incorrect to claim “Lumpl is made from Goliath.”  This is because the 
constitution relation only points in one direction.  However, as stated above, the identity relation 
is symmetrical.  If Lumpl is identical to Goliath, then Goliath is also identical to Lumpl.  And 
second, constitution is a dependence relation such that an object depends on what constitutes it.  
For example: If Goliath is completely constituted by Lumpl, then Goliath is nothing over and 
above Lumpl.12  However, suppose Lumpl is identical to Goliath.  The claim that Lumpl cannot 
exist unless Goliath exists, while true, only reiterates the claim that these two things are identical.  
This would be similar to saying Goliath cannot exist unless Goliath exists.  The identity relation, 
unlike constitution, provides no information about dependence—it does no explanatory work.
Furthermore, let us take another look at Leibniz’s principle of the indiscernibility of 
identicals.  According to this principle, if two things are identical, they have all properties in 
common.  But what exactly does it mean to have all properties in common?  Gibbard seems 
particularly interested in a common duration of existence.  He wants to rule out the possibility 
that two objects can be identical even though one lives longer than the other.  Thus he stipulates 
that for two things to be strictly identical they must both begin their existence at the same time t1
                                                
12 This dependence relation may cause problems for those who argue that constitution is not enough for identity.  If 
an object is nothing over and above what constitutes it, how can it have different properties?  This problem will be 
discussed in a following subsection.
14
and cease to exist at the same time t2.  Initially, it seems like he overlooks
13 other properties a 
thing may have—specifically their dispositional or modal properties.14  Consider what 
Wasserman says of the constitution view:
The defender of the constitution view makes three important claims.  First, objects of the common sense 
ontology exist…  Second, these objects have the sorts of de re modal properties and persistence conditions 
that common sense attributes them.  Lumps of clay, for example, can survive being squashed, while statues 
cannot.  Third, the defender of the constitution view claims that constitution is not identity…  Given the 
first assumption above, the constitution theorist recognizes the existence of the statue and the lump and, 
given the second, the constitution theorist claims that these objects differ in their de re modal properties.15
Thus Goliath and Lumpl are distinct due to their difference in modal or dispositional properties.  
For example, Baker argues against constitution as identity by appealing to essential properties.  
In the case of Goliath and Lumpl, she argues:
(1) Goliath is essentially a statue.
(2) Lumpl is not essentially a statue.
(3) Therefore, Goliath ≠ Lumpl.
According to Baker, an essential property is one such that, if an object did not have it then it 
would cease to exist.16  Therefore, the property ‘being a statue’ is essential to Goliath.  If Goliath 
was not a statue, it would no longer be Goliath.  However, if Lumpl were not a statue, it would 
(or rather might) still exist.  Thus Lumpl is not essentially a statue.  Similarly, one might appeal 
to dispositional properties.  True, at t1 both Goliath and Lumpl may begin their existences, but 
                                                
13 Gibbard eventually addresses dispositional and modal properties.  This will be discussed later.
14 Though this may be controversial, something’s capacity to do x seems like an appropriate candidate for a property 
that that thing might have.  Thus if clay L has the capacity to be shape w but statue G could never be shape w, these 
are different properties.  This may also be seen as potentialities—clay L has the potential to be shape w while statue 
G has no such potential.
15 Ryan Wasserman, “The Constitution Question,” Nous 38, no. 4 (2004): 693.
16 Lynn R. Baker, “Why Constitution is Not Identity,” The Journal of Philosophy 94, no. 12 (1997): 601-602.
15
they never have in common the capacity to change shape—only Lumpl has this property.  Thus 
if this dispositional condition counts as a genuine property then, according to Leibniz’s principle, 
these are two different objects.  However, this position faces problems.  I will examine two 
problems in this paper: (i) Upholding this view forces one to accept the counterintuitive 
conclusion that two distinct objects exist in the exact same place and time, and (ii) different 
dispositional properties of completely coincident objects are ungrounded.
II.A.1 Distinct Objects Co-located in Space and Time
One might argue that advocating the nonidentity of completely coincident objects such as 
Goliath and Lumpl leads to strange consequences.  Specifically, it leads one to conclude that 
Goliath and Lumpl are two distinct objects.  This seems counterintuitive.  How can distinct, 
concrete objects be spatio-temporally coincident at all times?  The constitution theorist’s answer:
Distinct objects can occupy the same space at the same time if they are made from the same 
materials.17
According to the constitution theorist, Goliath and Lumpl exist in the same place and 
time because they share the same material parts.  They share the same molecules, the same 
matter, the same parts, etc.  And, seeing as the constitution theorist denies constitution as 
identity, these two spatio-temporally coincident objects are not necessarily the same.  In fact, as 
mentioned in the previous subsection, Goliath’s being made from Lumpl entails their 
nonidentity.  This is because constitution and identity are two very different relations—
specifically, the former relation is asymmetrical while the latter is symmetrical.  If Lumpl 
                                                
17 The ‘one object to a place’ reasoning, under the constitution theorist’s view, applies only to objects of the same 
sort.  Thus the constitution theorist would reject the idea that two distinct statues (or lumps of clay) could occupy the 
same place and time.  
16
constitutes Goliath, Goliath clearly does not constitute Lumpl.  And for two things to be 
identical, they must share all the same properties, including relational properties.  Thus Goliath 
and Lumpl are not identical, for they do not share all the same properties.
Unfortunately, the constitution theorist’s answer only pushes the question back one step.  
While material coincidence may explain spatio-temporal coincidence, what explains material 
coincidence?  The constitution theorist might claim that material constitution explains material 
coincidence: Two distinct objects are made of the same material because one object constitutes 
the other.  In this case, Lumpl and Goliath are materially coincident because Lumpl constitutes 
Goliath.  Thus it is only natural that they share all the same parts.  However, what does it mean 
for Lumpl to constitute Goliath?  If, as Wasserman believes,18 every analysis of constitution must 
include “…a condition according to which x constitutes y at t only if x materially coincides with 
y at t,” then the constitution theorist cannot provide a sufficient answer to this question.  For such 
an answer invokes the relation that constitution is being used to explain—that is, material 
coincidence.  Now, this does not necessarily mean the constitution theorist believes that material 
coincidence is explanatorily prior to material constitution.  (In fact, I believe the constitution 
theorist believes just the opposite—that material constitution is explanatorily prior to 
coincidence.)  What this does mean, however, is that the constitution theorist cannot sufficiently 
explain what it is for two distinct objects to be materially coincident.  This is because that which 
is explanatorily prior to material coincidence—material constitution—is defined in terms of 
material coincidence.
II.A.2 Appealing to Non-Categorical Properties
                                                
18 Wasserman, “The Constitution Question,” 707.
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However, suppose two distinct objects could in fact occupy the same spatio-temporal 
location.  Some proponents of the constitution theory, as noted above, argue that Goliath and 
Lumpl have different modal or dispositional properties.  Thus they must be distinct.  Again, 
consider Baker’s argument: Goliath is essentially a statue while Lumpl is not.  Thus Lumpl and 
Goliath have different modal properties; therefore they are distinct.  However, such an appeal to 
modal or dispositional properties in order to show the nonidentity of Lumpl and Goliath is 
unsatisfactory.  This is because, given the complete coincidence of Lumpl and Goliath, such 
differences in properties remain unexplainable.
Appealing to dispositional19 properties may not sufficiently show Lumpl and Goliath as
distinct.  One reason for this is that nothing grounds these alleged properties.  In virtue of what 
do they have these properties?  Goliath and Lumpl are intrinsically and relationally indiscernible: 
They are the same shape, made from the same material, share the same atoms, the same distance 
from the Eiffel Tower, etc.  Nothing about Goliath or Lumpl grounds their distinct dispositional
properties.  In other words, nothing intrinsically or relationally about Lumpl grounds the fact that 
it could have been a different shape.  Similarly, nothing intrinsically or relationally about Goliath 
grounds the fact that it could have survived one of its arms breaking off.20  Furthermore, consider 
                                                
19 From here on, I combine my treatment of two different kinds of properties—modal and dispositional properties—
referring to them simply as dispositional properties.  This is because the following objections raised argue against 
the distinctness of two coincident objects with respect to their possible properties—properties an object would have 
given certain conditions—rather than their categorical properties.
20 Answering this grounding problem is beyond the scope of this paper.  For more information, see Bennett (2004), 
Baker (1997), and Sider (2008).  
While Sider’s paper is informative in laying out the problem, he approaches the grounding problem by appealing to 
supervenience.  The problem with using supervenience, however, is that it is simply not the same as grounding.  
While grounding is a dependence relation, supervenience is a covariance relation.  At best, it seems that 
supervenience may indicate the presence of a dependence relation, but fails to pinpoint the direction of this possible 
relation.  This can be seen in the anti-symmetric nature of covariance.  For example, the volume of a sphere 
supervenes on its surface area; but it is also true that the surface area of a sphere supervenes on its volume.  Clearly 
there is a connection here between surface area and volume.  And it seems very possible that there is an underlying 
dependence relation between the two.  But supervenience does not shed any light on this possible relation.  For 
more, see Kim (1984), Kim (1993), and Lowe (1994). 
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the fact that the constitution relation is a dependence relation.  If Goliath is constituted by Lumpl, 
then it is nothing over and above Lumpl.  If this is true, then how can these two objects be 
distinct?  If Goliath and Lumpl are in fact distinct, then it remains unclear what the constitution 
theorist means by “nothing over and above.”
Now, the constitution theorist upholding a theory of temporal parts may argue, in the 
general lump-and-statue cases, that the lump of clay and statue are different sorts with different 
non-categorical properties due to their difference in temporal parts.  However, even this answer 
will not work for Gibbard’s story of Goliath and Lumpl.  For they begin to exist and cease to be 
at the same times.  Thus they share all their temporal parts as well as their categorical properties.
Even if one could solve this grounding problem for non-categorical properties, the 
contingent identity theorist might claim that it does not even make sense to appeal to such 
properties.  One might argue that such properties are merely properties that an object has in 
another possible world, not properties it has in the actual world.  Consider what Gibbard claims 
about the dispositional property solubility:
A disposition like solubility is a property which applies to concrete things, and it can be expressed as a 
counterfactual conditional: ‘x is soluble’ means “If x were placed in water, then x would dissolve.”  This 
counterfactual conditional in turn means something like this: “In the possible world which is, of all those 
worlds in which x is in water, most like the actual world, x dissolves.”21
Thus these properties merely claim particular objects could have been different, not that they are 
in fact different.  Of course, we may frequently attribute such properties to things in our 
everyday discourse. For example, I may claim, “Goliath and Lumpl are completely coincident, 
but they seem distinct because the former would not have survived being squeezed.”  Here they 
only seem distinct, as I have not attributed any actual properties to either object.  To say that 
                                                                                                                                                            
21 Gibbard, “Contingent Identity,” 209.
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Goliath would not exist if you were to squeeze Lumpl does not attribute any definite properties to 
either Goliath or Lumpl.22  Thus if we are to uphold the necessity of identity in light of statue-
and-lump cases such as Goliath and Lumpl, appealing to non-categorical properties will not 
work.
II.B An Eliminativist Objection
Initially one might think that something strange is going on in the Goliath and Lumpl 
case because one or both of these objects do not actually exist.  While it may seem that we are 
naming two objects (a lump of clay and a statue), we are actually just providing a description of
the newly formed lump of clay: This newly formed lump of clay, Lumpl, is Goliath-shaped.  By 
doing this, one is not actually saying that some new object known as ‘Goliath’ exists.  One is 
simply describing the current state of Lumpl.  To see this, consider Socrates sitting down.  
Clearly no new object ‘seated-Socrates’ comes into existence when Socrates sits down.  This is 
simply Socrates displaying the property of seatedness.  And it seems we could say that Socrates 
and Socrates-sitting are identical.  But this is trivially true.  Similarly, one might argue, that 
saying Lumpl and Goliath are identical is trivially true because ‘Goliath’ is merely a description;
it is neither a concrete object nor a rigid designator, just Lumpl in some particular shape.  
Peter Unger (1979) makes similar claims in support of mereological nihilism.  He argues 
that ordinary things, such as tables and chairs and statues, do not exist.  Only objects with no 
proper parts exist, such as atoms.  Unger supports this claim by providing the sorites of 
decomposition by minute removals argument:23 24 Suppose we have a stone, which is constituted 
                                                
22 Ibid, 210.
23 Peter Unger, “There are no Ordinary Things,” Synthese 41, no. 2 (1979): 120-121.
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by n number of atoms.  If we remove one of these atoms, we result in n-1 number of atoms, but 
presumably we still have a stone.  Now further suppose we gradually remove the atoms 
(eventually resulting in n-2 number of atoms, then n-3 atoms, and so on) until there are no atoms 
at all.  It seems absurd to presume we still have a stone after removing all of the atoms, for the 
stone, as we have mentioned above, is constituted by a finite number of atoms.  Thus, according 
to Unger, it seems that we must deny the existence of such ordinary things as stones above and 
beyond their mereological simples, such as their atoms.25  Though this refutation of the existence 
of ordinary objects is a much stronger claim than the one provided in the above paragraph, a 
similar tactic is being used.  Goliath does not actually exist.  All that actually exists is that which 
composes Goliath.
Similarly, consider what Merricks claims about the composing something relation which 
holds between the parts of a composite object:26 Seeing as people are physical organisms, they 
are made of parts, which are their atoms.  Thus, according to Merricks, it follows that “… the 
composing something relation holds between the atoms of [the] body.”27  Therefore there are 
atoms that are arranged my-right-footwise and there are atoms arranged your-nosewise, but these 
objects do not come together to further compose another object.  Similarly, the atoms arranged 
statuewise do not come into any further composing something relation to create a statue.  Thus if 
                                                                                                                                                            
24 I use this argument here to show that mereological nihilism may have some intuitive appeal.  Further discussion of 
this particular argument, I believe, is beyond the scope of this paper.
25 Now, it is important to note that, according to Unger, there is no question whether a genuine object is present or 
not.  That is, genuine objects do not have vague identity conditions such that the removal of their most minute 
particles results in there being no object at all.  For example, consider the removal of a speck-of-dust’s worth of 
particles from a stone.  Now, presumably the effect of their removal is so minimal that a stone survives.  If this is the 
case, then, as Unger claims, “…we can ‘peel our onion’ down to nothing.”  This might be something similar, say, to 
the gradual breakdown of boulders and rock formations from wind erosion in arid climates.  See Unger, “Ordinary 
Things,” 120-124.
26 See also van Inwagen (1990).
27 Trent Merricks, “No Statues,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 1 (2000): 49.
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10,000 atoms are arranged statuewise, the proponent of this view would claim that only 10,000 
things exist (just the atoms), not 10,001 things (the atoms arranged statuewise and the statue).  
According to Merricks, other than the atoms arranged statuewise, nothing further exists.  Thus 
there actually are no statues.
Initially, an eliminativist approach seems quite successful.  It denies the existence of one 
or both objects.  By doing this it avoids appealing to non-categorical properties because it never 
claims that two distinct objects share the same location in space and time.  Also, because it does 
not appeal to non-categorical properties, it avoids the grounding objection which the constitution 
theorist must answer.  However, in the next two subsections, I raise two problems with this 
approach: (i) The possibility that there is a fundamental level of objects is just as plausible as the 
possibility that there are no mereological simples, and (ii) even if there was a definite 
fundamental level of objects, we would still wind up with reference and identity problems.
II.B.1 A Fundamental Level of Reality28
The eliminativist approach relies on the assumption that a fundamental level of objects 
exists.  According to this view, only mereological simples—objects that consist of no proper 
parts—exist.  But what evidence indicates that a fundamental level of reality actually exists?  
According to Unger’s sorites of decomposition by minute removals argument, the atom is 
assumed to be the fundamental level of reality which makes up ordinary things such as rocks.  
However, Unger mentions that the “…reasoning for this denial [of ordinary objects] does not 
                                                
28 Much of the discussion for whether there is a fundamental level of reality is beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, I would like to at least show, in part of this section, that the discoveries made by the hard sciences indicate 
that a fundamental level is no more plausible than infinite division of parts.  For more discussion on the justification 
of a fundamental level of reality, see Schaffer (2003), Zimmerman (1996), and Unger (1979).
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require atoms or particles.”29  In fact, he claims that his argument does not require any particular, 
minute unit.  “For all we care,” according to Unger, “the only physical reality may be a single 
plenum.”30  However, while he claims that his argument does not require any particular unit, a 
fundamental level of reality is necessary for his argument to hold.31  To see this, consider
Jaegwon Kim’s description of the overall fundamentalist view:
The Cartesian model of a bifurcated world has been replaced by that of a layered world, a hierarchically 
stratified structure of “levels” or “orders” of entities and their characteristic properties.  It is generally 
thought that there is a bottom level, one consisting of whatever microphysics is going to tell us are the most 
basic physical particles out of which all matter is composed (electrons, neutrons, quarks, or whatever).32
In other words, the eliminativist approach takes a fundamentalist stance toward reality.  And 
from this assumption of a fundamental level, Unger and other eliminativists can uphold an 
ontological attitude toward objects such that the fundamental level which constitutes these 
objects is primarily real.  For, according to the eliminativist position, without a fundamental level 
of reality, either nothing would actually exist or the level at which objects actually exist simply 
seems arbitrary.  Thus the eliminativist’s denial of the existence of ordinary objects only works if 
there is some fundamental level to reduce these objects to.  Still, the question lingers, “Does this 
fundamental level of reality actually exist?”
Much of the motivation for upholding the intuition that there is a fundamental level of 
reality comes from the empirical work done by the hard sciences.  The discovery of atoms and 
particles that make up larger objects, which in turn make up even larger objects, provides one 
                                                
29 Unger, “Ordinary Things,” 120.
30 Ibid, 122-123.
31 Similarly, Merricks’s argument for the non-existence of things like statues rests on the assumption of a 
fundamental level.  
32 Jaegwon Kim, “The Nonreductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation,” in Supervenience and Mind: Selected 
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 337.
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with the idea of a hierarchical system at work in nature.  For example, a swimming pool 
(assuming it is filled with pure water) is made out of water, which is made from the molecule 
H2O, which can be further broken down into hydrogen and oxygen atoms.  What we see and 
interact with everyday can be broken down into simpler, more fundamental parts until we finally 
arrive at the most fundamental level of reality—one that cannot be broken down into smaller 
parts.33  
Now, just because we assume an entity to be simple does not actually entail that there is 
in fact a fundamental level of reality.  Consider the fact that at one point the atom was seen as the 
fundamental level of reality.  But since then, protons and neutrons have been discovered.  And 
since the discovery of protons and neutrons, quarks have been discovered.  If this pattern 
continues, which seems perfectly plausible, it may be the case that there just are no mereological 
simples.  Of course, one might point out that physics always points to a basic level that does 
causal explanatory work.  However, a more basic level that also does causal explanatory work 
has always been discovered.  Thus it is always discovered that these basic levels of reality can be 
broken down into smaller parts.  “Indeed,” as Schaffer claims, “the history of science is a history 
of finding ever-deeper structure.”34  Even quarks, it is hypothesized, are actually strings.  Thus 
can we really look to physics to support the claim that a fundamental level of reality exists?  Not 
until we have a complete picture of physics and microphysics.35
In fact, it may even be argued that infinite divisibility is methodologically preferable to 
the eliminativist fundamental level of reality.  One reason many uphold the existence of a 
                                                
33 This idea of levels seems to be similar to that of a part-whole relation where the parts of an object make up the 
whole object.  The parts, in this case, would be more fundamental such that the whole is grounded in its parts.
34 Jonathan Schaffer, “Is There a Fundamental Level?” Nous 37, no. 3 (2003): 503.
35 For more examples involving the history of physics, see Schaffer, “Fundamental Level,” section five.
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fundamental level is because it avoids a chain that infinitely regresses.  It seems to provide one
with a complete picture of the structure of nature.  This picture includes all parts which ground 
the whole.  Again, this picture of reality assumes a part-whole relationship where the parts 
ground the whole.  However, the grounding relation is an asymmetric, irreflexive relation.  Thus, 
unless the fundamental level is simply ungrounded, it seems implausible that there is such a 
level.  For what explains the existence and workings of these ungrounded mereological simples?  
Infinite division, on the other hand, allows for such explanations to be given.  The workings of 
each whole can be explained by the workings of their parts; and the workings of these parts can 
be explained by their parts.  Such a world—one filled with substances with infinitely divisible 
parts—would be gunky.  That is, the proper parts of every substance are also substances.  Thus 
every substance can be further broken into proper parts ad infinitum.36  Even though we may not 
have a “complete” picture, we would have one that embraces the part-whole structure of reality.
Still, one might want to maintain something similar to eliminativism without having to 
uphold its positive claim about the existence of a fundamental level of reality.  This would be the 
weaker claim briefly mentioned at the beginning of the above subsection: Goliath is merely a 
property that Lumpl displays—Lumpl is shaped Goliathwise.  So, instead of claiming that only 
the most fundamental level of reality exists, this view acknowledges the existence of the clay but 
not the statue.  The problem with this view is that it is arbitrary.  Why acknowledge that one 
level of reality exists but not the next?  Is there any significant difference between Lumpl and 
Goliath such that we can deny the existence of Goliath without appealing to a fundamental level?  
I think not.  If one denies the existence of Goliath on grounds of material substance, she is 
                                                
36 Under such a model, one might adopt a theory of existence monism rather than mereological nihilism.  The 
infinite division of substances may, instead, support the view that the world is the only simple, concrete object.  For 
more, see Schaffer (2007).
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committed to the nonexistence of Lumpl as well.  This is because an even more fundamental 
level of parts constitutes Lumpl, which in turn also constitutes Goliath.
However, even if one could successfully argue for the nonexistence of Goliath without 
resorting to a fundamental level of reality, I do not think it (along with the standard eliminativist 
position) avoids the problems raised in the following subsection.  Specifically, if we deny the 
existence of either of these material objects, we run into problems with reference and identity.
II.B.2 Reference, Identity, and Eliminativism  
When we talk about Goliath, the eliminativist, as I have described above, would either 
claim that the proper name ‘Goliath’ refers to a group of mereological simples in a specific shape 
(strong claim), or that it refers to a specific lump of clay in a particular shape (weak claim).  
However, this way of speaking runs into reference and identity problems.  I will talk about the 
strong and weak claims individually, starting with the former.
As mentioned in the above subsection, the assumption of a fundamental level of reality is 
questionable and needs further justification, but let us suppose there actually is a fundamental 
level that the eliminativist can appeal to.  Therefore, according to the stronger claim of 
eliminativism, the material objects, Lumpl and Goliath, are nothing more than the mereological 
simples which constitute them.  However, initially it may seem like if we reduce these objects to 
their most fundamental level of reality, we lose something important about the object we refer 
to—specifically, we lose an object’s individuality.  When we talk about a statue named 
‘Goliath,’ we are concerned with a specific object.  If I point to a replica of Goliath, not realizing 
that what I am referring to is merely a replica, and talk about the replica as if it is the real statue, 
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I am mistaken.  For what I refer to is only qualitatively identical to Goliath, not numerically 
identical.  Consider this example: Suppose we have a lump of clay, Lumpl, arranged 
Goliathwise.  Thus we have a set of mereological simples arranged in a particular statuewise 
fashion.  But now suppose that somehow, miraculously, Lumpl disappears and is instantaneously 
replaced (such that there is no time where an object is missing) by a different lump of clay, 
Flumpl, also arranged Goliathwise.  Thus because a different object, Flumpl, replaces Lumpl, it 
would be wrong to refer to Flumpl when talking about Goliath.  However, according to the 
eliminativist position, there seems to be nothing wrong with this, so long as the arrangement of 
their mereological simples is qualitatively identical.
Now, the eliminativist would demur, claiming that no such reference problems occur.  
Reducing material objects to their fundamental level does not strip away an object’s 
individuality.  Just because things only really exist at their atomic level does not mean that 
individual facts do not exist.  Indeed, when the eliminativist talks about Goliath, she is interested 
in its mereological simples.  However, she is also interested in a specific object.  To be more 
precise, she is interested in the specific arrangement of mereological simples that constitute 
Goliath.  Thus when we replace Lumpl with the qualitatively identical Flumpl, we are mistaken 
when we refer to the latter as ‘Goliath’.  This is because the particular atomic structure—the 
specific arrangement of mereological simples that compose Lumpl—is linked to Goliath.  
Similarly, such problems may be avoided with the weaker claim—one that acknowledges the 
existence of the clay material that constitutes the statue.  Consider the example of Lumpl and 
Flumpl again.  In the event in which Lumpl disappears and is replaced by Flumpl, the proponent 
of the weaker claim could appeal to the specific lumps of clay.  She could argue that, even 
though Lumpl disappears, when we talk about Goliath we still mean Lumpl in such-and-such 
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shape.  Thus when we point to Flumpl while talking about Goliath (because we are unaware of 
the switch that occurs), we are simply mistaken.  
However, the problem that still lingers for the strong eliminativist claim is the fact that 
Goliath is nothing more than a particular arrangement of fundamental particles.  This claim is too 
strong and has counterintuitive results.  Suppose just the nose of Goliath breaks off.  In this case
the particular arrangement of mereological simples that compose Lumpl changes.  And if we are 
solely concerned with the mereological arrangement, then it seems we have a new object.  Given 
a lump of clay’s persistence criteria, it seems okay to claim that Lumpl no longer exists.37  More 
specifically, the atomic structure that once composed Lumpl changes, resulting in a new 
structure.  Thus, the old atomic structure ceases to exist, as does Lumpl.  But does this mean that 
Goliath no longer exists?  Suppose we have a set of mereological simples arranged Goliathwise.  
Let us call this atomic structure C.  Now suppose that the nose of Goliath breaks off.  This results
in the changing of atomic structure C.  Let us call this new, noseless structure atomic structure D.  
If ‘Goliath’ is used to refer to a specific atomic structure—atomic structure C—then we are now 
mistaken when we use ‘Goliath’ to talk about D.  However, given everyday use of language, we 
should not be mistaken.  It seems perfectly plausible for Goliath to outlive Lumpl—or, in this 
case, the specific arrangement of mereological simples that constitute it.  However, linking 
‘Goliath’ to the specific atomic structure that composes it severely changes its persistence 
criteria.  Goliath can no longer outlive a change in that which constitutes it.  Thus the link 
between Goliath and its arrangement of mereological simples is too strong.  
                                                
37 (This is taken from section 1.)  A piece of clay P consists of a portion of clay.  This piece P exists when all parts 
of P stick together and no part of P sticks to any portion of clay that is not part of P.  Thus it follows that a new 
piece of clay can be formed by either breaking off part of P or attaching more clay to P.  However, remolding P into 
different shapes does not threaten the existence of P.
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Similarly, the weaker eliminativist claim holds that Goliath is merely a property of 
Lumpl.  Thus whenever we talk about Goliath, we really mean Lumpl in a specific Goliathwise 
shape.  But is this really what we mean when we talk about Goliath?  Consider this version of the 
Lumpl and Goliath case:38 Suppose two lumps of clay come together, simultaneously creating a 
new lump and a statue.  Let us call the new lump of clay ‘Lumpl’ and the statue ‘Goliath’.  Now 
suppose that the sculptor who created Goliath decides to break off its arms, replacing them with 
new pieces of appropriately molded clay.  It is clear in this case that Lumpl no longer exists.  
However, if Goliath is merely a property that can be had by Lumpl, it seems that Goliath must 
not exist either.  But would we claim that Goliath ceases to exist because Lumpl no longer 
exists?  That seems strange.  In fact, it seems clear that Goliath continues to exist while Lumpl 
does not since statues can survive certain changes that lumps of clay cannot.39
To give another example, consider this worry about numerical identity:40 Suppose we 
maintain a wooden ship by replacing each old plank with new ones.  Furthermore, suppose we 
change one plank each week.  Now, it seems reasonable to claim that, after all the planks are 
changed, the same numerical ship exists.  But if we were to argue that the new ship is 
numerically distinct (as both the strong and weak claims of eliminativism would uphold), at what 
point is the ship no longer the same?  Is it after the 55th plank is replaced? or the 30th?  If so, then 
why?  Unless one argues that a new ship exists after the first replacement, it seems arbitrary.  But 
                                                
38 Mark Johnston, “Constitution is Not Identity,” Mind 101, no. 401 (1992): 89-90.
This different version of the Lumpl and Goliath case is taken from Johnston.  Johnston simply uses it as the standard 
case of Lumpl and Goliath, but I think it is useful to show that Goliath is actually something independent of Lumpl.
39 Some might argue that replacing the arms does in fact change the statue.  But suppose we do not replace the arms 
at all.  Thus we do not combine any new material with the original statue.  Would we say that Goliath no longer 
exists?  I suppose some might suggest that Goliath is not the original Goliath.  But I am not sure if one would go so 
far as to say that it ceases to exist.  Consider the Venus de Milo.  Did a new statue come into existence when its arms 
and original plinth broke off?
40 While Hobbes’s primary reason for presenting the Ship of Theseus is to present a problem of numerical identity 
where a=b and b=c but ~ (a=c), there is a lingering worry about arbitrariness when denying the gradual replacement 
theory.
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does a new ship really exist after one plank is replaced?  This seems counterintuitive.  In fact, it 
seems perfectly plausible that something like a ship, or a statue, can continue to exist even 
though some of its parts are replaced or even cease to exist.  If so, then things like ships and 
statues are more than just properties held by that which constitutes them.  
While resorting to eliminativism (or some weaker version of it) may seem like a plausible 
response to the Lumpl and Goliath case, as shown above, this viewpoint has potential problems 
and unjustified assumptions.  The main problem, for both the strong and weak eliminativist 
claims, can be seen when trying to refer to a specific object that could either (a) be qualitatively 
similar to other objects or (b) exist longer than the material that constitutes it.
II.C Concluding Remarks
The two common solutions to statue and lump cases addressed above—constitution 
theory and eliminativism—are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.  Both theories uphold 
counterintuitive claims: The constitution theory concludes that two distinct objects are spatio-
temporally co-located, and eliminativism claims that ordinary objects do not even exist—only 
their mereological simples exist.  Furthermore, the constitution theorist fails to provide a 
convincing argument for the acceptance of non-categorical properties as definite, distinguishing 
properties, and the eliminativist fails to justify the assumption that a fundamental level of reality 
exists.  Even though these theories have their own individual problems, it seems to me that the 
main problem is they are simply misguided—specifically, they assume that Lumpl and Goliath 
must not be identical.  So they address lump-and-statue problems as ones concerning material 
constitution.  In the next section I argue that lump-and-statue cases are problems about language 
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and reference rather than material constitution.  Furthermore, I claim that upholding a Kripkean 
notion of naming and reference allows one to uphold the necessity of identity in light of statue-
and-lump cases.
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III. Modal Intuitions and the Necessity of Identity
In the first section of this paper I argued for the incoherence of the doctrine of contingent 
identity by showing that it leads to an absurdity.  Thus if two things are identical, they are 
necessarily identical.  However, as we have seen, statue-and-lump cases such as the one 
presented by Gibbard present a problem for the necessity of identity.  This is because we have 
two completely coincident objects—Goliath and Lumpl—that seem to be identical but could
have been otherwise.  Thus it seems to follow that if one is to uphold that two things are identical 
if and only if they are necessarily identical, she must argue that Goliath and Lumpl are not 
actually identical in the case where they are completely coincident.  And this is exactly what the 
proposed solutions examined in the second section do.  They attempt to maintain the necessity of 
identity by arguing for the nonidentity of these two objects.  And in order to do this, the 
proponent of either of these solutions examines the material constitution of these objects.  The 
constitution theorist claims that the statue and lump of clay are not identical because the latter 
constitutes the former; and constitution is not identity.  The eliminativist, on the other hand, 
argues that these objects do not actually exist—only their most fundamental particles exist.
But why must the proponent of the necessity of identity argue for the nonidentity of 
Goliath and Lumpl?  It seems that the presupposition that Goliath and Lumpl must not be 
identical stems from the modal intuition that they could have been different.  Clearly if Goliath 
and Lumpl are not completely coincident in some possible world W*, they are not identical in 
W*.  And if they are not identical in W* then they are not necessarily identical.  Thus, because it 
seems that Goliath and Lumpl could have been not completely coincident, they must not be 
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necessarily identical.  And so it follows that the proponent of the necessity of identity must argue 
for the nonidentity of Lumpl and Goliath.
In this section I argue that the proponent of the necessity of identity is in fact not
committed to the nonidentity of Goliath and Lumpl.  In fact, one can coherently uphold that the 
two are not only identical, but necessarily identical.  This can be done by reconstruing one’s 
modal intuitions.  The reconstrual method I use is one proposed by Kripke.
III.A Reconstruing Modal Intuitions
Consider the following argument:
(1) Hesperus is necessarily Hesperus.
(2) Phosphorous is not necessarily Hesperus.
Therefore, (3) Hesperus is not identical to Phosphorous.
Assuming that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ are both rigid designators,41 it is clear that this 
argument is valid.  However, the conclusion is false.  For we have empirically discovered that 
both ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ refer to the same object—namely, Venus.  But, as I have just 
mentioned, the argument is valid.  So if the conclusion is in fact false, we must deny one of the 
premises.  Clearly we cannot deny (1).  For how can an object fail to be itself?  Thus our only 
option is to deny premise (2).  But what reason would we have for denying (2)?
Premise (2) is based on our modal intuition that ‘Hesperus’ could have referred to a 
celestial body different than what ‘Phosphorous’ refers to.  We seem to have no trouble 
                                                
41 Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 109.
‘Hesperus’ is a rigid designator for the certain celestial body that can be seen in the evening at such-and-such 
location.  ‘Phosphorous’ is the rigid designator for the certain celestial body that can be seen in the morning at such-
and-such location.
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imagining this possibility.  Suppose that in world W, Mars happens to be the evening star and 
Venus happens to be the morning star.  Thus in W, ‘Hesperus’ refers to Mars, not Venus.  If this 
is the case, then it seems that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ are not identical in W.  Therefore, it 
seems that Phosphorous must not necessarily be Hesperus.  However, Kripke provides the 
essentialist with a method that allows her to coherently deny (2) by reconstruing her modal 
intuitions.
In order to reconstrue our modal intuitions, we must first recognize the distinction 
between metaphysical and epistemic possibility.  To see this, let us briefly turn our attention to a 
different example.42  Suppose I ask the following: “Could heat have been something other than 
mean molecular kinetic energy?”  Now, it seems perfectly possible that the internal sensation 
which corresponds to the external phenomenon of heat could be produced from something other 
than the motion of molecules.  But we would no longer be talking about heat.  If heat just is
mean molecular kinetic energy, then the possibility that heat might have turned out not to be 
mean molecular kinetic energy is merely an epistemic possibility, not a metaphysical one.  
Claiming that heat might really have been produced by something other than molecular 
motion—say, for example, light—is not to claim that the particular external phenomenon that 
we refer to as heat could be produced by light.  It is to assert that one could have been in “…a 
situation in which a stream of photons would have produced the characteristic sensations which 
we call ‘sensations of heat’.”43  Thus we could be having the same internal sensory experiences, 
but heat is replaced by shmeat—an external phenomenon identified in the same way as heat.  As 
it turns out, if heat is identical to mean molecular kinetic energy, then it simply could not have 
turned out otherwise.
                                                
42 Example taken from Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 129-32.
43 Ibid, 132.
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Now suppose I ask the following: “Could Hesperus have turned out not to be 
Phosphorous?”  This is a very similar question to the one asked in the previous paragraph.  Just 
as ‘heat’ refers to a particular external phenomenon, ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ both refer to 
a particular planet-object.  In fact, they refer to the same particular object.  Thus to claim that 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ could have, or even might have, referred to different objects 
would be false.  Of course, it is in fact possible that some other celestial bodies might have 
occupied the same position in the sky at the appropriate times—one in the morning and the other 
in the evening.  Notice, though, that we are replacing a false statement with a true contingency.  
As Kripke claims, “The inaccurate statement that Hesperus might have turned out not to be 
Phosphorous should be replaced by the true contingency…: two distinct bodies might have 
occupied, in the morning and the evening, respectively, the very positions actually occupied by 
Hesperus-Phosphorous-Venus.”44
Notice that the examples mentioned in the above two paragraphs rely on a further 
distinction in order to draw out the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility.  
Specifically, it relies on the distinction between a name and the properties used to fix its 
reference.45  For example, I may fix the reference of the name ‘Hesperus’ as the celestial body 
that appears in the evening.  But this does not entail that ‘Hesperus’ means the celestial body that 
appears in the evening.46  If this was entailed, then it would be impossible for some other 
celestial body to have this property.47  However, as shown in the example in the above 
paragraph, some other celestial body could have had the property of being the heavenly body that 
                                                
44 Ibid, 143.
45 Kripke, “Identity and Necessity,” 184.
46 That is, ‘Hesperus’ is not synonymous with ‘the celestial body that appears in the evening.’
47 Michael Della Rocca, “Essentialists and Essentialism,” The Journal of Philosophy 93, no. 4 (1996): 191.
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appears in the evening.  Thus this is merely a description of Hesperus.  And the description used 
to fix the reference of a name is not synonymous with the name itself.  More specifically, “…we 
use the name rigidly to refer to the object so named, even in talking about counterfactual 
situations where the thing named would not satisfy the description in question.”48  For example, 
we could imagine a case where Hesperus is not the celestial body that appears in the evening.  
But this does not mean that, in the imagined case, Hesperus would not have been Phosphorous.  
It simply means that some other celestial body occupies the very position that Hesperus actually 
occupies.
With the distinctions made in the above paragraphs, one can now coherently deny (2).  
Let us reexamine the modal intuition used to generate premise (2): Phosphorous is not 
necessarily Hesperus.  Now, what is imagined is a possible case where some celestial body other 
than Hesperus happens to be the morning star.  And from this counterfactual situation, the 
proponent of (2) concludes that Phosphorous must not be Hesperus because the morning star is 
no longer referred to by Hesperus.  I will rewrite the conclusion of this intuition as (4):
(4) There is a possible situation where Phosphorous fails to be Hesperus.
However, this conclusion mistakenly takes a name and a property used to fix its reference as 
synonymous.  The contingent property of being the celestial body that appears in the morning at 
a certain location is used to fix the reference of the name ‘Phosphorous.’  But this is merely a 
contingent property.  ‘Phosphorous’ does not mean the celestial body that appears in the 
morning.  Instead, ‘Phosphorous’ rigidly refers to the object picked out in the actual world, even 
if it does not have the contingent property used to fix its reference.  From this distinction, we can 
instead conclude (4*):
                                                
48 Kripke, “Identity and Necessity,” 184.
36
(4*)  There is a possible situation where something that is not Phosphorous, but is 
identified in the same way that Phosphorous is identified in actuality, fails to be 
Hesperus.
According to Kripke, the essentialist arguing for the nonidentity of Hesperus and Phosphorous 
conflates (4) and (4*).49
Now if the essentialist recognizes the distinction between a name and the description 
used to fix its reference, she can reconstrue her intuitions to allow for the identity of rigid 
designators and the necessity of identity.  In the example provided, the essentialist is not 
committed to the nonidentity of Hesperus and Phosphorous.  She simply needs to express her 
modal intuitions as (4*) instead of (4).  Thus Kripke has given the essentialist a plausible 
strategy which allows her to coherently uphold the identity between two rigid designators.
III.B Reconstruing Intuitions about Lumpl and Goliath
Before we apply Kripke’s method of reconstruing modal intuitions to the case of Goliath 
and Lumpl, I would like to first address Gibbard’s claims about Kripke’s account of rigid 
designators.  He argues that “the claim that Goliath = Lumpl… is incompatible with Kripke’s 
account of proper names.”50
Gibbard acknowledges that, under Kripke’s account of proper names, all proper names 
are rigid designators.  However, he goes on to claim that if this is true then Goliath cannot be 
identical with Lumpl.  He argues that rigid designators “…denote that thing in every possible 
                                                
49 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 143-4.
50 Gibbard, “Contingent Identity,” 194.
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world in which it exists, and denote nothing otherwise.”51  Thus in the case of Goliath and 
Lumpl, the designators ‘Goliath’ and ‘Lumpl’ denote those objects in every world in which they 
exist.  Let us take another look at Gibbard’s case of Goliath and Lumpl.  In the actual world W, 
Goliath and Lumpl are completely coincident—Goliath = Lumpl in W.  However, in some 
possible world W* Goliath is squeezed out of existence before Lumpl hardens—Goliath ≠ Lumpl 
in W*.  Now, Gibbard argues that, because Goliath = Lumpl in W, ‘Goliath’ and ‘Lumpl’ denote 
the same thing.  And because Goliath and Lumpl exist in W*, they must denote the same thing in 
W* as well.  But this is not the case, for Goliath ≠ Lumpl in W*.  Thus, according to Gibbard, the 
claim that Goliath is identical to Lumpl is incompatible with Kripke’s account of proper names 
as rigid designators.
However, why must we conclude that the Goliath and Lumpl we are interested in exist in 
W*?  Gibbard seems to believe that Goliath and Lumpl exist in W* because they have the same 
origin and persistence criteria as the Goliath and Lumpl of W.52 According to Gibbard, once 
Goliath is created, nothing can change the origin of this particular statue. And as it comes into 
existence, a set of persistence criteria accompanies it.  He claims, “Once I made my statue, that
statue existed, and nothing that happened from then on could change the fact that it had existed 
or the way it had come to exist.”53  There is a certain fact of the matter about how the statue 
came into being.  Thus, he claims, the origin of the statue is what makes it the same statue.  
                                                
51 Ibid.
52 Of course, they also display all the same properties (shape, size, location, etc.).
53 Gibbard, “Contingent Identity,” 195.
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Indeed, Kripke has similar inclinations toward an origin theory of essentialism.54  For 
example, he claims, “It seems to me that anything coming from a different origin would not be 
[the same] object.”55  Thus even Kripke believes that the origin of an object is an essential 
property of that object.  It is important to note, however, that Kripke’s theory of origin is weaker 
than Gibbard’s.  Kripke is not excluding the possibility that some object X in another possible 
world may have the same origin as a distinct object Z in the actual world.  For he claims: “I am 
not suggesting that only origin and substantial makeup are essential.  For example, if the very 
block of wood from which the table was made had instead been made into a vase, the table never 
would have existed.”56 He is simply claiming that having the same origin as it does in the actual 
world is a necessary criterion for its existence in some possible world, not a sufficient criterion.
Now, it seems perfectly plausible that two distinct objects could have some of the same 
essential properties.  For example, being such that 2 + 2 = 4 is true is a necessary property shared 
by all things.  And is it not possible that some object other than Goliath could have had the same 
origin?  Of course some other object could have had the same origin.  Consider the above quote 
from Kripke: “For example, if the very block of wood from which the table was made had 
instead been made into a vase, the table never would have existed.”57  The vase and table have 
the same origin—they are made from the same block of wood, composed of the same molecules, 
made at the exact same time—but they do not share all the same essential properties.  
Specifically, the vase does not share the table’s essential property of being a table.58  
                                                
54 See Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 111-113, 115 f. 56.  In particular, in footnote 56, Kripke argues, “If a material 
object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any other matter.”
55 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 113.
56 Ibid, 115 f. 57.  Emphasis added.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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Furthermore, is it not possible that, in some counterfactual situation, some other object with the 
same origin as Goliath could have also been named ‘Goliath’?  Consider what Kripke says about 
the use of names in counterfactual situations:
Recall that we describe the situation in our language, not the language that the people in that situation 
would have used.  Hence we must use the terms [‘Goliath’] and [‘Lumpl’] with the same reference as in the 
actual world.  The fact that people in that situation might or might not have used these names for different 
[objects] is irrelevant.  So is the fact that they might have done so using the very same descriptions as we 
did to fix their references.59
Thus Gibbard is simply conflating a name with the properties used to fix its reference.  It just 
seems like the Goliath and Lumpl we are interested in exist in W*.
Still, one might ask: “What reason do we have for believing that something with the same 
origin as Lumpl but fails to be identical to Goliath is not actually Lumpl?”  Answer: Lumpl and 
this other object do not have all the same essential properties.  Both objects may share the same 
origin, but, as Kripke claims, origin is not the only essential property of an object.60  Now, in the 
first section of this paper I argued for the necessity of identity—that is, if two objects are 
identical, they are necessarily identical.  Thus, if this is true, identity is a necessary relation.  So 
if Lumpl is in fact identical to Goliath in the actual world, Lumpl has the necessary property of 
being identical to Goliath.  However, the object described in Gibbard’s counterfactual situation 
does not have this essential property.  Even though it is called ‘Lumpl’ and has the same origin 
                                                
59 Ibid, 109 f. 51.  Emphasis added.
60 My goal here is not to provide an exhaustive list of essential properties.  I only want to give at least one essential 
property that Lumpl has that the Lumpl-like object in Gibbard’s counterfactual situation does not.
40
as the Lumpl in the actual world, it does not have the essential property of being identical to 
Goliath.61
Now let us see how the essentialist can reconstrue her modal intuitions about Lumpl and 
Goliath.  First, let us represent the essentialist argument for the nonidentity of Lumpl and Goliath 
with the following:
(5) Goliath is essentially a statue.
(6) Lumpl is not essentially a statue.
Therefore, (7) Goliath is not identical to Lumpl.
Premise (6) is based on the modal intuition that Lumpl could have been squeezed before it had a 
chance to harden.  However, we can reconstrue this intuition as (6*):  
(6*)  There is a possible situation where something that is not Lumpl, but is identified 
in the same way that Lumpl is identified in actuality, fails to be a statue 
throughout its entire existence.
But consider the fact that the reference of ‘Lumpl,’ according to Gibbard, is fixed by a certain 
property—specifically, the origin of Lumpl in the actual world.  Thus Lumpl is identified by the 
property of being “…formed by a certain artisan at a certain time by joining a lump in the shape 
of the top half of [Goliath’s] body and a lump in the shape of the bottom half of [Goliath’s] 
body.”62  Let us refer to this property as G.  If we recognize that G is merely a property of Lumpl
used to fix its reference, it is clear to see how the essentialist can further specify her reconstrual 
of (6) as (6**):
                                                
61 Notice that if the necessity of identity does attribute an essential property, there is no possible world in which 
Lumpl exists and is not identical to Goliath.
62 Della Rocca, “Essentialists and Essentialism,” 197.
41
(6**)  There is a possible situation where something that is not Lumpl, but has the 
property of G, fails to be a statue throughout its entire existence.63
Kripke has thus provided the essentialist with a method of maintaining that completely 
coincident objects are in fact identical without giving up the necessity of identity.  Statue-and-
lump cases, like the one proposed by Gibbard, lose their force once we recognize the distinction 
between a name and the properties used to fix its reference.
Now, a nonidentity essentialist might argue that the identity essentialist cannot properly 
argue for the identity of Lumpl and Goliath by appealing to modal intuitions.  In fact, because 
the reconstrual of modal intuitions is available to the essentialist, she cannot properly argue for 
or against the identity of these objects by appealing to her intuitions.  This is because the 
essentialist arguing for identity would have to show that (6**) and not (6) is the correct way to 
express our intuitions.64  And one arguing for nonidentity would have to show (6) is the correct 
intuition.  However, to do this would be to argue over the identity of Goliath and Lumpl.  For, as 
Della Rocca claims: “We know that if identity holds then [(6**)], and not [(6)], is the proper way 
to express our intuition and we know that if identity does not hold then [(6)] can be seen as the 
proper expression of our modal intuition.”65  Now, with regard to the proper way to express our 
modal intuition, I believe Della Rocca makes a very good point.  As an essentialist, to argue for 
or against the identity of Lumpl and Goliath based on our modal intuitions would be question 
begging.  However, in light of the counterintuitive views66 the essentialist must accept in order to 
                                                
63 One might demur that Goliath, which is mentioned in the property of G, shows that at least Goliath exists in the 
counterfactual situation while Lumpl does not.  And that, she might claim, is enough to show that they are not 
identical.  However, I am merely appealing to the shape of Goliath, not Goliath itself.  Clearly, something could be 
shaped like Goliath without actually being the particular Goliath we are interested in.
64 Della Rocca, “Essentialists and Essentialism,” 196.
65 Ibid.
66 See section II.
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uphold that Goliath and Lumpl are distinct, I believe serious doubts have been cast upon their 
position.  Thus I believe the essentialist has better reasons to accept the identity67 of completely 
coincident rigid designators rather than their nonidentity.
III.C Conclusion
Throughout this paper I have argued against the doctrine of contingent identity.  In the 
first section I argued that if we postulate the possibility of two things being contingently 
identical, an absurdity arises.  Therefore if any objects are identical, they are necessarily 
identical.  However, as we have seen, statue-and-lump cases present a potential problem for the 
necessity of identity.  Specifically, Gibbard’s case of Lumpl and Goliath is especially 
problematic because it presents a case where two objects that are identical seem like they could 
have been otherwise.  And because of this modal intuition that Lumpl and Goliath could have 
been distinct, the proponent of the necessity of identity may feel committed to upholding their 
nonidentity.  But, as I have shown in the second section, upholding the nonidentity of completely 
coincident objects leads one to accept very counterintuitive views about material objects.  Under 
some views, it may force one to accept that there are distinct objects co-located in time and 
space.  And under others, one might have to deny the existence of everyday objects such as 
tables and chairs.  However, in the last section I argue that a more palatable option is available to 
the essentialist—one that avoids the problems the nonidentity theories cannot.  If one recognizes 
the distinction between a name and the properties used to fix its reference, she can reconstrue her 
                                                                                                                                                            
67 That is, identity of the sort that holds necessarily if at all.
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modal intuitions to accept completely coincident objects as identical without giving up the 
necessity of identity.
Now, notice that the reconstrual of one’s modal intuitions simply allows the essentialist 
to acknowledge the identity of completely coincident objects without giving up the necessity of 
identity.  Thus, by reconstruing her modal intuitions, the essentialist can uphold the necessity of 
identity without having to accept the view that two distinct objects exist in the exact same place 
and time.  Acknowledging the identity of completely coincident objects lends itself well to 
common sense intuitions about objects—specifically, the idea that only one object occupies a 
particular place at a time.  And because this view maintains identity, it also avoids attributing 
different dispositional properties to completely coincident objects.
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